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THE VIEW FROM MY WINDOW 
GREGORY P. MAGARIAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The experience of writing a book and then reading what some very smart 
and knowledgeable people have to say about the subject matter is humbling 
and a little dizzying. In Managed Speech: The Roberts Court’s First 
Amendment, I try to make some sense of the present Supreme Court’s 
decisions over the past decade about the First Amendment’s protections for 
free expression.1 The book argues that those decisions, taken as a whole, 
excessively constrain free speech within a particular managerial framework. 
Rather than helping speech to flourish in all its noisy, messy glory, the 
Roberts Court favors First Amendment claims from powerful institutional 
speakers while backing the government against more socially and politically 
marginal speakers. Corporate political spenders2 and commercial data 
miners3 exemplify the Roberts Court’s First Amendment winners, while 
peace activists4 and fringe religions5 exemplify its losers. The Roberts 
Court’s First Amendment priorities constitute the managed speech of my 
title. The book contrasts managed speech with a free speech model I call 
dynamic diversity, which seeks to protect the change-making capacity of 
free speech by maximizing the range of perspectives and participants in 
public debate.6 
Managed Speech opens a window onto the Roberts Court’s First 
Amendment. This symposium affords me the privilege of looking out, from 
the constraints of my knowledge and imagination, to observe what some 
friends whose work I greatly admire see in the spaces that window reveals. 
The main part of this essay highlights and briefly discusses some of the 
insights that I have found most immediately stimulating and valuable from 
                                                           
* Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. I am deeply grateful to the editors of 
the Washington University Law Review for hosting this symposium and to all of the symposium 
participants, especially the contributors to this volume, for their engagement with my ideas. Between 
the symposium’s conception and fruition, I lost both of my parents, Jean and Don Magarian. I would be 
nowhere without their inspiration, support, and love. This is for them. 
1. See generally GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2017). 
2. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
3. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
4. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
5. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). In fairness, a different sort of 
fringe religious group won a notable First Amendment victory before the Roberts Court. See Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). The book’s critique is a best-fit line, not a golden mean. 
6. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at xvi–xx. 












each contribution to the symposium. The final section indulges some soul-
searching. Our society over the past two years has plunged into a state of 
political chaos and uncertainty that, for many of us, has brought an 
overwhelming sense of rapid, highly unappealing displacement. Is this 
really the right time for me, or any person of good will, to be loudly 
criticizing the Supreme Court’s penchant for stability and insisting that, 
instead, First Amendment law should prioritize political and social 
dynamism? 
I. THE SYMPOSIUM: DYNAMIC DIVERSITY IN ACTION 
Given that Managed Speech advocates an approach to First Amendment 
law called “dynamic diversity,” this collection of writings perfectly fits a 
symposium around the book. The contributions reflect a great diversity of 
perspectives, ranging from more theoretical to more doctrinal, more 
descriptive to more normative, more targeted in their concerns to more 
general. The contributions also show a vibrant dynamism. The authors 
deploy their varied expertise and talents to develop incisive thoughts and 
critiques about the Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and 
about how my book tackles that jurisprudence. 
A. Justice in the Streets 
Richard Nixon famously damaged his 1960 campaign for the U.S. 
presidency by visiting every state in the nation, an effort that left him 
depleted and his campaign unfocused.7 The broad coverage of a book like 
Managed Speech creates a similar risk. Examining a decade of the Supreme 
Court’s free speech decisions requires attention to a great range of subjects 
and contexts, from state primary elections8 to high school sports,9 vanity 
license plates10 to stoner comedy.11 Managed Speech centrally criticizes the 
Roberts Court’s subordination of political and social dissent to managerial 
order, and my dynamic diversity theory prioritizes dissent.12 That priority, 
however, can get obscured in the thicket of details. I wrote this kind of book 
because the present Supreme Court provides a useful laboratory for teasing 
out First Amendment doctrine’s immediate pathologies and an important 
                                                           
7. See THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960 263–78 (1961). 
8. See New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
9. See Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291 
(2007). 
10. See Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). 
11. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 













context for understanding them. Still, that approach leaves me looking for 
the thematic car keys under a very specific streetlight. 
Timothy Zick manages to ameliorate both the breadth and the 
narrowness of Managed Speech.13 Professor Zick is a preeminent scholar of 
public protest.14 That subject has become increasingly important in our 
society over the past decade, but the Roberts Court has largely ignored it. 
Here Professor Zick trains a critical laser on the implications of managed 
speech for public protests. He properly calls out the Roberts Court for 
protecting only public political activity that does not disrupt social order15 
and for subordinating U.S. speakers’ transnational political activism to the 
government’s assertions about national security risks.16  
At the same time, Professor Zick situates the central arguments of 
Managed Speech in both a deeper historical context and a wider socio-
cultural context. The Roberts Court did not invent the pathologies at the 
heart of my critique, and the Supreme Court—indeed, the law—does not 
cabin them. Professor Zick richly details how past Supreme Courts created 
templates for managed speech. In a nuanced critique of the public forum 
doctrine, for example, he shows how the Court has long conditioned public 
speech rights on an expectation that public speakers will not deviate widely 
from established political and social norms.17 Even more important, and 
more troubling, Professor Zick shows how elected officials and our society 
at large care even less for public protest than the Roberts Court does. While 
the Court diminishes protest rights through mere neglect, state legislatures 
plot to squelch street demonstrations and license physical attacks on 
protesters.18 Universities establish their own bureaucratic and punitive 
mechanisms for managing the speech resources they control.19 Most 
dispiriting of all, large segments of the public condemn protesters whose 
                                                           
13. See Timothy Zick, Managing Dissent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
14. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN 
PUBLIC PLACES (2009).  
15. See Zick, supra note 13 (manuscript at 10–11) (discussing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014)). 
16. See id. (manuscript at 13) (discussing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 
(2010)). 
17. See id. (manuscript at 8–12). 
18. See id. (manuscript at 15–16). 
19. See id. (manuscript at 34–38). I agree with Professor Zick’s suggestion that university 
students’ speech can itself become a form of speech management when students seek “a say in the 
management of outside speakers.” Id. (manuscript at 5–6). Mere participation in a discussion is not 
speech management, but speech that seeks to constrain other speech by influencing or building an 
institutional power structure can be managerial. For my own thoughts on the relationship between 
student speaker protests and universities’ institutional power, see Gregory P. Magarian, When Audiences 
Object: Free Speech and Campus Speaker Protests, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 












messages they oppose, like professional football players who take a knee 
during the National Anthem to protest institutional racism.20 
Managed Speech calls on the Supreme Court to expound a more dissent-
friendly First Amendment doctrine.21 Professor Zick correctly points out 
that even the highly unlikely realization of that goal would not reach the 
roots of our problem with public dissent. Law is only as reliable as the social 
reality that contains it, and speech values in particular rest on a social rather 
than legal foundation. Professor Zick sets out an urgent project for a wise 
free speech agenda: changing society, not just law, to deepen appreciation 
for the value of public dissent. From the sobering perspective he provides, 
our challenge does not simply entail making legal institutions embrace a 
richer version of the First Amendment.  Rather, we have to convince regular, 
busy people to welcome and engage with challenges to received wisdom 
and social norms. 
B. The Anti-Cynical First Amendment 
Garcetti v. Ceballos22 strikes me as one of the Roberts Court’s most 
frustrating free speech decisions. Richard Ceballos, an assistant district 
attorney in Los Angeles, found good reasons to believe his office had 
misrepresented key facts in a criminal prosecution. He wrote his concerns 
in a memo to his supervisors. For his trouble, they downgraded his 
assignments and declined to promote him. The First Amendment protects 
public employees against job reprisals when they speak about “matters of 
public concern.”23 The Roberts Court, though, found that Ceballos had not 
spoken about a matter of public concern when he notified his superiors 
about possible misconduct. Instead, he had merely created work product that 
belonged to the District Attorney. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
reasoned that letting the First Amendment check government employers’ 
absolute control over such work product would impose an unacceptable cost 
on government efficiency. The decision defers reflexively and thoroughly 
to the government employer’s managerial interest. It completely ignores the 
societal benefits of protecting conscientious government employees who try 
to ensure, from inside the public workplace, the integrity of the people’s 
business. 
                                                           
20. See Zick, supra note 13 (manuscript at 43–44). 
21. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at 243–44. 
22. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 













Oscar Wilde’s Lord Darlington defined a cynic as “[a] man who knows 
the price of everything, and the value of nothing.”24 Garcetti, by those 
lights, stands out as an exceptionally cynical piece of First Amendment 
adjudication. The Supreme Court only sees (and likely exaggerates) the cost 
of the dissident lawyer’s speech while ignoring its value. In fact, First 
Amendment law has a persistent problem with valuing speech. Courts get 
understandably nervous about the prospect of ascribing different sorts of 
value to different sorts of speech. Courts, after all, are part of the 
government, and the First Amendment axiomatically bars the government 
from drawing content-based distinctions among different speakers and 
expressions. Judicial reluctance to assess the value of speech, unfortunately, 
leaves speech more vulnerable to the government’s regulatory—or 
managerial—whims. In situations like Garcetti, where the government can 
claim special authority or urgency for restricting speech, flattening the 
distinctive value of the speech in question leaves the government’s claim 
effectively unchallenged. Managed Speech maintains, as I have argued 
before,25 that courts should take a frankly normative approach to balancing 
speech interests against government prerogatives. Making that approach 
work, however, presents a serious challenge. 
Heidi Kitrosser squarely confronts that challenge.26 Professor Kitrosser’s 
account of how government employees advance First Amendment 
principles by scrutinizing the government’s messages provides a brilliant, 
clear model of how to construct an argument about the normative value of 
particular speech.27 She identifies a baseline First Amendment interest: the 
public’s access to information, particularly about matters of government 
policy and practice.28 She then defines a metric: the degree to which the 
public understands the government’s behavior free from willful government 
distortions of reality. Finally, she uses that metric to assess the speech at 
issue—public employees’ internal and internal reports about their 
employers’ actions and motives—against the baseline interest.29 Crucially, 
public employees possess the key expressive resources of insider 
knowledge and access to important internal channels of communication.30 
                                                           
24. OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE’S FAN 96 (The Floating Press ed., 2009) (1892). 
25. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From 
the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 185 (2007). 
26. See Heidi Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech and Magarian’s Dynamic Diversity, 96 WASH. 
U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
27. See id. 
28. See id. (manuscript at 22–23). 
29. See id. (manuscript at 10–12). 
30. See id. (manuscript at 13). 












Professor Kitrosser persuasively shows how those advantages imbue public 
employee speech with far more value for public discourse than the Roberts 
Court grasped in Garcetti. 
Professor Kitrosser offers her valuation of public employees’ internal 
critiques as a “friendly supplement” to the dynamic diversity theory I 
promote in Managed Speech,31 and I welcome the refinement. What of 
courts’ insistence about the need for neutrality and impartiality in 
adjudicating First Amendment disputes? I think judges’ recourse to those 
shibboleths ends up infecting First Amendment doctrine with exactly the 
kind of bias they aim to avoid. Abjuring valuation disadvantages speech, 
such as public employees’ internal push-back against their employers’ 
willful distortions, that relatively less powerful speakers create under the 
sway of relatively more powerful institutions. Professor Kitrosser lays this 
problem bare when she dissects the Garcetti Court’s impoverished 
assessment of public employees’ internal speech.32 Determining the 
normative value of particular speech is not easy; but then, easy is not always 
good. Shrugging off vulnerable speech is easy when you avoid confronting 
the value that speech contributes to society. The kind of difficult analysis 
Professor Kitrosser’s paper advocates and performs would make First 
Amendment law more forthright, more grounded in practical reality, and 
more beneficial to the public interest. 
C. There Is Power in a Union 
The Roberts Court’s most striking First Amendment quirk has been its 
fixation on protecting non-union government workers from every 
conceivable risk of political association with public sector unions. The 
Supreme Court long ago decided that the First Amendment protected non-
union workers from supporting public sector unions’ political advocacy but 
not from funding the unions’ collective bargaining services.33 In two recent 
cases,34 with a third on the near horizon,35 the Roberts Court has restricted 
unions’ ability to collect and use the “agency fees” that some public sector 
labor contracts require non-members to pay unions for collective bargaining 
costs. These decisions erase unions’ First Amendment interests by focusing 
entirely on non-union workers’ First Amendment rights while treating 
                                                           
31. Id. (manuscript at 13). 
32. See id. (manuscript at 22–23). 
33. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
34. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Empls. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 
567 U.S. 298 (2012). 
35. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Empls. Council 31, 851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 













agency fees as impositions of government power rather than fuel for unions’ 
expressive autonomy.36 The Roberts Court’s analysis of the agency fee 
cases continues a long Supreme Court pattern of refusing to acknowledge 
and grapple with collisions of First Amendment interests.37 
Like the problem of valuing speech, the problem of colliding First 
Amendment interests resists easy resolution. Just as Professor Kitrosser uses 
the Roberts Court’s public sector employment cases to illuminate the 
valuation problem, Tabatha Abu El-Haj uses the Roberts Court’s public 
sector labor cases to illuminate the colliding interests problem.38 Professor 
Abu El-Haj’s key move is to distinguish the essentially expressive interests 
of non-union workers from the essentially associational interests of 
unions.39 Viewing these colliding First Amendment interests as 
conceptually distinct phenotypes gives Professor Abu El-Haj a way to 
prevent their collision. She can describe the pre-Roberts Supreme Court’s 
distinction between unions’ problematic political and unproblematic 
collective bargaining activities not as a half-baked protection for non-union 
workers’ speech interests but instead as a fulsome, prudent reconciliation of 
two different sorts of First Amendment interests.40 
Like Professor Kitrosser’s valuation analysis, Professor Abu El-Haj’s 
analysis of colliding interests injects a welcome dose of normative 
substance into a First Amendment problem whose avoidance has caused the 
Roberts Court and its predecessors to hand down some highly questionable 
decisions. Like Professor Kitrosser, Professor Abu El-Haj proposes friendly 
revision of my dynamic diversity model for First Amendment law.41  She 
offers two related amendments: first, that I should recognize the importance 
not just of diverse discourse (free speech) but also of diverse opportunities 
for collective action (free association or assembly); second, that I should 
acknowledge the proper grounding of both sorts of First Amendment rights 
in a procedural commitment to robust legislative policymaking.42 I fully 
embrace the first point, but I remain conflicted about the second. 
I have long identified with the tendency in First Amendment scholarship 
to tether First Amendment rights to the functional needs of democracy. Over 
                                                           
36. See MAGARIAN, supra note 1, at 219–20. 
37. See generally Magarian, supra note 25. 
38. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Public Unions Under First Amendment Fire, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) 
39. See id. (manuscript at 12–13). 
40. See id. (manuscript at 10–21). 
41. See id. (manuscript at 8). 
42. See id. (manuscript at 58–63). 












time, though, I have moved from a resolute version of that commitment43 
toward a more qualified variant, paying greater attention to diverse social 
as well as political underpinnings of the First Amendment. Managed Speech 
reflects that slippage or evolution. I admire Professor Abu El-Haj’s resolve 
and consistency in viewing both expressive and associational rights in terms 
of their contributions to republican democracy, but I cannot work entirely 
within the boundaries that vision draws. Professor Abu El-Haj cares about 
civic organizations as democratic structures. She thus worries not that the 
Roberts Court’s agency fee decisions will make it harder for unions to get 
their views out but rather that those decisions will make it harder for unions 
to organize their own members.44 In marginal but meaningful contrast, I care 
about unions’ capacity to organize because I care about organizing as the 
precondition for unions’ getting their views out. A rich sense of unions’ 
contributions to employees’ and society’s well-being shines through 
Professor Abu El-Haj’s analysis, reinforcing my own sense that unions 
matter not just for what they are in republican democracy but for what they 
say in public discourse. 
D. E Pluribus Novem 
Managed Speech seeks to treat the Roberts Court’s free speech decisions 
as a body of work, a unified if deeply complex text.45 That approach 
conceptualizes the Court as a collective entity, an idea at once central to the 
book’s value and somewhat limiting. The Justices of the Supreme Court, 
after all, are nine distinct, idiosyncratic individuals. In fact, the Roberts 
Court has included a total of twelve individuals: Justices Souter, Stevens, 
and Scalia have left the Court, replaced by new Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, 
and (after I finished the book) Gorsuch. Collective entities cannot have 
behavioral psyches (any more, one might crack, than corporations can have 
ideas); their actions just represent the intersections of individual vectors. 
Justice Breyer’s preference for pragmatic balancing, Justice Kennedy’s 
libertarian probity, and Justice Alito’s didactic moralism all produce very 
different approaches to First Amendment problems. Managed Speech 
acknowledges this conundrum and defends the collective entity approach, 
but it does not deal systematically with the Justices as individuals. 
                                                           
43. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional 
Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247 (2005). 
44. Abu El-Haj, supra note 38 (manuscript at 59–62). 













Ashutosh Bhagwat presents a smart, innovative strategy for addressing 
this problem.46 If we can identify important variables in individual Justices’ 
behavior, then we can track those variables over a salient set of cases and 
gain valuable insights about what makes each Justice tick. Professor 
Bhagwat shows how the Justices’ votes and reasoning in cases involving 
information technologies can help us profile their general attitudes toward 
technology, deepening our understandings of what they have done and 
enabling reasonable predictions about what they may yet do.47 Some 
members of the Roberts Court, like Justice Kennedy, are usually Candides, 
celebrating the benefits of information technologies; others, like Justice 
Alito, are usually Cassandras, warning against technological dangers; and a 
third group, exemplified by Justice Breyer, fall between those two extremes. 
This individualized analysis of the Justices’ attitudes provides a narrative, 
qualitative complement to quantitative analysis of their behavior by scholars 
like my colleague Lee Epstein.48 
Every attempt to make sense of the Supreme Court’s work runs into 
limitations. Managed Speech wrestles with outlier cases that pull against the 
thematic best-fit line I see running through the Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence. Likewise, a focus on individual Justices may overdetermine 
their attitudes based on small or inconsistent samples. Professor Bhagwat 
astutely considers that concern when, for example, he points out the 
prominence of threats to children in the technological dangers that the 
Court’s Cassandras emphasize49 and the untidy array of positions that 
idiosyncratic cases with multiple moving parts can cause a Justice to take.50 
In addition, coding Supreme Court opinions may invite specious 
classifications. For example, Professor Bhagwat codes Justices Ginsburg 
and Thomas as technology “Candides” in the context of their separate, brief 
statements that the Court should revisit its allowance for FCC regulations 
of broadcast “indecency.”51 Do those statements, though, really tell us 
anything about these Justices’ technological optimism or pessimism? The 
FCC indecency regulations stretch back almost a century. The Supreme 
Court decision that upheld the regulations forty years ago certainly 
pathologizes broadcasting enough to warrant the “Cassandra” tag.52 Justice 
                                                           
46. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Candides and Cassandras: Technology and Free Speech on the 
Roberts Court, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
47. See generally id.  
48. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, The Judicial Behavior of the Roberts Court, 54 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2018). 
49. See Bhagwat, supra note 46 (manuscript at 30). 
50. See id. (manuscript at 35–37) (discussing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)). 
51. See id. (manuscript at 11–15). 
52. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 












Thomas and Justice Ginsburg might well have questioned that decision, as 
Professor Bhagwat assumes, because they view its technological pessimism 
as baggage the Court should jettison in the name of technological 
optimism.53 On the other hand, those two Justices might want to liberate old, 
safe media from FCC regulations to beat back scarier, more fraught new 
media; or they might view constitutional indulgence of ancient FCC 
regulations as impeding the development of more effective strategies for 
restricting mass media speech; or they might want to inter the First 
Amendment’s differential treatment of broadcasting simply because they 
doubt whether technology should affect speech regulations one way or the 
other. Any of those possibilities would render the “Candide” tag misleading. 
Those problems come with the territory, but it’s a territory rich in 
intellectual promise. Professor Bhagwat, or somebody, should run with the 
approach he develops here to craft a fulsome profile of the individual 
Justices’ orientations in multiple dimensions of free speech jurisprudence. 
Such a project could replicate his examination of the Justices’ attitudes 
about technology to examine their attitudes about, for example, different 
political and other institutional structures, or different sorts of social 
movements. It could even cut across doctrinal categories, symbiotically 
extending the value of Professor Bhagwat’s insight to other fields. That 
work could yield a book of its own, or a massive database. I feel a little bit 
better about my failure to account adequately for the Justices’ distinctive 
identities when I realize how hard it would be to do the job as carefully and 
well as Professor Bhagwat has begun to do it here. 
E. Living in the Future 
Managed Speech does not say much about new media. The word 
“Internet” appears only eighteen times in the book’s more than 250 pages.54 
That may seem like an astonishing oversight in a book about free expression 
published in 2017. The book, however, says little about new media because 
the Roberts Court has largely avoided First Amendment issues that 
implicate distinctive features of new media. In a case that struck down a ban 
on selling violent video games to minors, Justice Scalia heaped surprising 
praise on interactive gaming.55 Otherwise, we have mostly heard crickets. 
The Court almost told us something about First Amendment protection for 
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big data, only to stumble past that opening.56 Another case featured an 
Internet wrinkle that the Court chose to smooth over.57 In cases about online 
threats58 and fleeting televised expletives,59 the Court avoided First 
Amendment issues altogether. Only after Managed Speech went to press, 
more than a decade into John Roberts’ tenure as Chief Justice, did the Court 
hand down a First Amendment decision, Packingham v. North Carolina,60 
that concentrates on Internet speech. 
Danielle Citron and my colleague Neil Richards argue with great force 
that Packingham indulges a brand of “magical thinking” about the Internet 
that impedes sensible thinking about twenty-first century expressive 
freedom.61 They make a powerful case for why we should care about the 
Internet’s distinctive free speech problems and how we might begin to 
address those problems. The Internet is where speech happens now, but it is 
also where speech increasingly struggles against severe constraints that defy 
the classic First Amendment template of government censorship.62 The 
Internet’s expressive architecture, Professors Citron and Richards argue, 
creates resource disparities and enables, indeed encourages, numerous 
forms of censorship by powerful private actors. Professors Citron and 
Richards emphasize what seems to me a crucial and underappreciated 
principle: protecting expressive freedom means fighting against 
concentrations of power, whether governmental or private, that threaten 
expressive freedom.63 I contend throughout Managed Speech that the 
Roberts Court puts managerial constraints on public discourse both by 
letting the government regulate some speech and by letting some powerful 
speakers avoid governmental limits on their autonomy. Professors Citron 
and Richards reach a similar conclusion as to digital expression. 
Professors Citron and Richards argue that the state action doctrine 
necessarily restricts the capacity of constitutional judicial review to address 
online speech constraints.64 By their account, the main thing First 
                                                           
56. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011) (implying without actually deciding 
that the First Amendment protects data flows as speech). 
57. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 449 n.1 (2011). 
58. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
59. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 (2012) (holding that the 
FCC’s “fleeting expletive” rule gave regulated media insufficient notice of what the rule prohibited); 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 520 (2009) (finding the rule neither arbitrary nor 
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act). 
60. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (striking down a ban on access to online social media by 
registered sex offenders). 
61. Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You 
Won’t Believe #3!), 96 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3). 
62. See id. (manuscript at 6–9). 
63. See id. (manuscript at 14–19). 
64. See id. (manuscript at 28–29). 












Amendment law needs to do for online free speech is avoid interfering with 
sensible legislative regulations. I am not so sure. I have long doubted 
whether the legal categories of “public” and “private,” on which the 
constitutional state action principle depends,65 can bear that weight.66 
Managed Speech criticizes the Roberts Court for manipulating the public-
private distinction to promote social and political stability.67 Our best 
defense against that sort of manipulation may be a good offense. For 
example, we might reconceive First Amendment law not merely to permit 
but rather to compel structural regulations such as net neutrality, in order to 
prevent the kinds of private encroachments on expressive freedom against 
which Professors Citron and Richards so persuasively warn.68 
Relegating First Amendment doctrine to a posture of opposing socially 
beneficial speech norms concedes too much both substantively and 
rhetorically to forces, including a majority of the Roberts Court, who cannot 
see—or do not mind—private power’s threat to expressive freedom. 
Professors Citron and Richards wisely urge the translation of “First 
Amendment values” into the online speech arena.69 What First Amendment 
values can we translate, though, if all we think the First Amendment itself 
can do is protect entrenched power? Professors Citron and Richards are 
surely right that constitutional doctrine cannot do all or most of the work 
needed to secure expressive freedom online.70 Even so, reforming the 
doctrine to help rather than hurt the cause seems to me an essential part of 
any agenda for doing that work. 
F. In Flanders Fields . . . 
Chad Flanders brings his acuity as a political theorist to bear on Managed 
Speech, a book that reflects my limitations as a legal scholar.71 Professor 
Flanders appears to make four main criticisms of my analysis. The first two 
concern the aspect of First Amendment doctrine that excludes certain 
speech categories from constitutional protection: (1) I am wrong to criticize 
First Amendment categoricalism (in Chapter One of Managed Speech), 
because keeping a fixed list of unprotected categories is a good way to 
                                                           
65. See id. (manuscript at 29 n.110). 
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ensure a speech-protective baseline; (2) I am wrong to criticize the Roberts 
Court’s novel invocation of tradition to explain and justify categorical 
speech exclusions, because history is a good way to constrain judicial 
discretion, certainly a better way than my proffered alternative of openly 
considering the normative values that support or oppose any given 
categorical exclusion. Professor Flanders’ other two criticisms concern my 
dynamic diversity prescription for First Amendment law: (3) Dynamic 
diversity is underdeveloped at a practical level because it does not give 
courts a doctrinal methodology for deciding cases; (4) Dynamic diversity is 
underdeveloped at a theoretical level because it does not explain why we 
should prefer change to stability. 
To help in answering these criticisms, let me briefly model how I believe 
the Supreme Court, or any Justice, confronts a First Amendment dispute. 
The Court first considers which parts of the vast corpus of First Amendment 
doctrine, set forth in the Court’s precedents, fit the facts of the dispute. The 
Court then makes a sincere attempt to apply the relevant doctrine to the 
dispute. However, the Court’s application of the doctrine to the facts, the 
Court’s determination about which doctrine fits the facts, and the substance 
of the doctrine itself all reflect normative preferences about deep political 
problems. One of those problems, whose importance I emphasize both in 
criticizing managed speech and in promoting dynamic diversity, is how to 
maintain a proper balance between preserving stability and enabling change 
in the context of First Amendment law. The Court, through its opinions, 
explains its decisions to the public and to other political actors in 
conventional doctrinal terms. However, even as the Court’s decisions track 
doctrine, they also effectuate the Court’s normative preferences. The Court 
usually presents its decisions to the public with conscious honesty, but 
theory and doctrine always interact uneasily beneath a decision’s surface. 
With that model in place, I can situate and respond to Professor Flanders’ 
four criticisms. As to the first, that I wrongly criticize the categorical 
methodology in First Amendment law, I throw myself on the mercy of a 
force for which Professor Flanders professes great respect: history. As I 
explain in Managed Speech, categorical First Amendment doctrine, while it 
retains some utility, represents an early, now rather musty evolutionary 
stage in First Amendment law’s development.72 After repeatedly defending 
the concreteness and reliability of First Amendment categories against the 
encroachment of “free-floating balancing,”73 Professor Flanders belatedly 
acknowledges the reality that renders his defense mostly irrelevant: “The 
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categorical approach may seem to occupy only a small part of First 
Amendment real estate. And it does only a limited amount of work.”74 Quite 
right, which makes even half-heartedly defending categoricalism a curious 
crusade at this late date. First Amendment balancing, a subject about which 
Professor Flanders’ brief musings around content-neutral speech 
regulations only scratch the surface,75 occupies most of the real estate and 
does almost all of the work. We live in a balancing world now; how well 
we like that world does not much matter. 
About my critique of the Roberts Court’s distinctive reliance on tradition 
to situate and justify what remains of categorical First Amendment doctrine, 
Professor Flanders and I genuinely disagree. He acknowledges that tradition 
is uncertain and at least somewhat subjective, but then he insists that 
tradition is concrete, “something that we do not decide but have to look 
for.”76 I think Professor Flanders misses some quite concrete reasons to 
reject tradition as a basis for jurisprudence. First, judges are generally 
neither competent nor trustworthy historians.77 Second, and more important, 
tradition’s false, or at least imperfect, aura of objective truth carries great 
hazards for the process by which the Supreme Court justifies its decisions 
to the public. Professor Flanders portrays judicial decision-making as a 
hermetic process that can cabin judicial discretion, thereby exorcising all 
normative content. I think judicial decision-making is an inevitably 
normative process where what ultimately matters is public acceptance of the 
Court’s decisions as legitimate. The appearance of objective truth for which 
Professor Flanders praises the Roberts Court’s appeal to tradition looks to 
me like a democratic pitfall. My proposed alternative, a substantive analysis 
of the normative values at stake in deciding whether some category of 
speech deserves First Amendment protection,78 has the democratic virtues 
of honesty and transparency. Let the Court tell us why it really reaches its 
results, and let us decide whether we find those results legitimate. 
As to dynamic diversity, Professor Flanders largely answers his own 
complaint that the theory does not function directly as doctrine. “[D]ynamic 
diversity . . . operates, or seems to operate, in the same conceptual space as 
managed speech. It is a theory about speech and the regulation of speech. 
[It] does not and cannot tell courts, at least not directly, how [they] should 
decide cases.”79 Indeed.  Dynamic diversity represents my ideal of what 
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First Amendment doctrine should look like.  How the doctrine might come 
to look that way would involve the complicated process, sketched in my 
model of First Amendment adjudication above, through which normative 
theory always drives doctrine. Professor Flanders is importantly right that 
transposing theory into doctrine, or even charting the relationship between 
theory and doctrine, is hard and messy. That difficulty, however, in no way 
sets managed speech apart from any other normative theory. If Professor 
Flanders ultimately means that we should not be talking about normative 
theory in connection with legal doctrine, then I respectfully but firmly 
disagree, for the same reason I oppose tradition as a specious justification 
for categorical First Amendment doctrine: the normative content of law is 
inevitable, and we need to deal with it in plain view. 
Finally, Professor Flanders reads me wrong when he asks why dynamic 
diversity favors “political and social change as such.”80 Again his own 
critique contains the seed of the answer he’s seeking. “[I]t is not clear,” he 
writes, “why we should only favor dynamic diversity when it comes to 
speech, as opposed to supporting [it] when it results in action.”81 My case 
for dynamic diversity holds that societies need to maintain a healthy balance 
between stability and change; that law necessarily gives governments great 
authority to maintain stability in the realm of action; that the realm of speech 
therefore carries the primary opportunities to bring about change; and 
accordingly that First Amendment law, in setting the normative terms of 
constitutional speech protection, should take special care to protect people’s 
freedom to advocate change.82 I do not argue for dynamic diversity in the 
realm of action because dynamic diversity is specifically a theory about 
speech, rooted in the crucial distinction between speech and action that 
necessarily (though problematically) undergirds the whole project of 
constitutional speech protection. 
With that foundation in place, I can answer Professor Flanders’ specific 
question about why dynamic diversity endorses the Roberts Court’s First 
Amendment protections for animal cruelty videos83 and violent video 
games,84 even though (he posits) government efforts to ban those forms of 
speech may have embodied positive social change.85 I favor the speech 
protections because I care, as a matter of First Amendment theory, about 
preserving opportunities to advocate change, not about whether change does 
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or does not happen. My substantive hope is that “good” established orders, 
whatever that might mean, will gain strength from interrogation in public 
discourse, while “bad” orders will fall before it. That hope partakes of the 
same epistemic skepticism Professor Flanders deftly articulates.86 
Professor Flanders poses one question that has troubled me for a long 
time: “Is free and open speech the best vehicle for social change?”87 Maybe, 
he suggests, the change-enabling role I want free speech to play in society 
is not optimized by dynamic diversity’s prescription of maximizing the 
number of participants and range of ideas in public discourse. Political 
scientists have raised powerful objections to the premise that open public 
discourse drives democratic politics.88 Likewise, legal academic 
communitarians89 and critical race theorists90 have long argued that public 
debate does not bring the social benefits that First Amendment advocates 
claim for it. Professor Flanders and I share a commitment to robust First 
Amendment rights, but he raises an important concern about the stability 
(pardon that term) of our commitment’s foundations.  
II. THERE IS GREAT DISORDER UNDER HEAVEN 
When I finished the manuscript for Managed Speech in September 2016, 
I thought I had written a book about a judicial era that had reached its end. 
A new Court, with a Democratic president filling the vacancy opened by 
Justice Scalia’s death, would consign Chief Justice Roberts to the unusual 
status of a rump chief. The Court’s new center-left majority would make a 
receptive audience for my and others’ ideas about what the book 
optimistically calls “the next First Amendment.”91 I also thought I had 
written a book for a continuous, steady, even boring political epoch. Our 
center-left government had proven, at a minimum, professional and 
competent; our next president, a consummate insider with an extraordinary 
governmental resume, would maintain the country on its well-charted 
course. In that political context, my call for dynamic diversity—a normative 
First Amendment theory that prioritizes facilitating change over 
maintaining stability—seemed salient and viable.  
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As events ran their course in November 2016 and beyond, it turned out 
that I had actually written a book about the first segment of a judicial era 
whose end likely will not come for a long time. We will not see “the next 
First Amendment” in the foreseeable future. Instead, the Roberts Court can 
continue to develop a First Amendment doctrine that advances and refines 
managed speech. It also turned out that I had written a book for a moment 
of political whiplash. A foreign power meddles with impunity in our 
national election.92 Our unhinged president impulsively tweets nuclear 
threats.93 Extremists—down to and including actual Nazis—spew their hate 
in public forums.94 All of this sludge churns through an information 
environment that is constantly mutating into forms no one could have 
imagined just a few years ago. We feel grave anxiety and uncertainty about 
the future. 
The beating heart of Managed Speech, the essence of dynamic diversity, 
is my conviction that First Amendment law should enable challenges to all 
manner of social and political establishments by encouraging the broadest 
possible range of participants and ideas in public discourse. That vision 
grounds my critical view that the Roberts Court’s First Amendment goes 
too far in letting established institutions, both governmental and private, 
control and often dampen the contributions to public discourse of ordinary 
voices, especially voices from the social, political, and economic margins. 
Since the apotheosis of Donald Trump, I have worried about—well, many 
things, but the one that matters in this forum is the possibility that post-2016 
reality dooms the normative case for a First Amendment grounded in 
dynamic diversity. 
Many people, including people with whom I agree about lots of 
important things, seem to yearn now for more stability, not less. They 
increasingly trust, for deliverance from our political hellscape, the same 
institutions whose empowerment Managed Speech laments.95 Democrats 
lionize a vanquished F.B.I. director as a heroic avatar of resistance to 
presidential power96 and the intelligence community in general as a crucial 
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check against government excesses.97 Liberals rely on the military and its 
leaders to resist the President’s erratic will and keep us back from the 
nuclear brink.98 Progressives concerned about diversity praise giant 
corporations as paladins of nondiscrimination99 and cultural inclusion.100 
This solicitude for powerful institutions has a deep philosophical corollary: 
the extolling of objective truth in an age of “alternative facts.”101 
Longing for stability, institutional order, and objective truth makes sense 
amid the cursed earth of Trumpism. Managed Speech shows, however, that 
enlisting powerful institutions to maintain stability in public discourse puts 
dire constraints on expressive freedom. This symposium illustrates that 
dynamic. Prioritizing stability hardens societal antipathy toward Professor 
Zick’s public protesters. It makes judicial biases against Professor Abu El-
Haj’s unions and Professor Kitrosser’s government whistleblowers a lot 
tougher to dislodge. It greatly complicates the technological optimism of 
Professor Bhagwat’s Candides and the progressive vision of digital speech 
drawn by Professors Citron and Richards. Like a lot of other people, I have 
learned hard, valuable lessons over the past two years about how low our 
political and civic culture can sink. Even so, I believe the challenges of this 
wretched moment affirm, rather than refute, the value of dynamic diversity.  
No political term has lost more luster in the Trump era than “populism.” 
It’s the label many people like me—highly educated, socio-economically 
privileged, connected to formidable institutions—tend to slap on the 
Trumpist debasement of our politics and society.102 A familiar account of 
the 2016 election holds that white working class voters rose up in a wave of 
torches and pitchforks that carried Donald Trump to the White House.103 In 
fact, though, Trump mainly owes his election to ordinary Republican voters: 
most definitely white, but also relatively affluent.104 Anxious left-liberals 
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call out the crude Nazis and nativists who take up Trump’s invitations to 
attack and demean our fellow Americans, but we say less about the role that 
business interests play every day in supporting and sustaining Trumpism. 
We form an easy picture of rubes duped by Russian-seeded pro-Trump 
propaganda, but we hold a much hazier image of willful, high-information 
Trump voters who knew exactly what they were doing on Election Day. We 
need to whip out our reality glasses.105 Our society has not entered some 
new era in which crude barbarians trash beneficent institutions. Rather, we 
have simply entered a new stage in the continuing ascendance of powerful 
institutions that wallow in self-interest and radiate indifference or hostility 
toward the needs and aspirations of the vast majority. 
I still believe in a species of democratic populism: a politics in which 
ordinary people and groups conceive and sustain humane institutions to 
serve the public interest. I am not a big Ben Franklin fan—given my left-
wing civil libertarian bent, Thomas Paine is more my kind of Founder—but 
I love Franklin’s description of our baby nation as “[a] republic . . . if you 
can keep it.”106 Constantly testing and questioning established truths and 
institutions is the seed work for keeping our republic. We sustain and renew 
our social order through our ongoing exchange of ideas. Truth is not a gift 
we gratefully accept from generous institutions; it’s a resource we boldly 
mine with our intellectual curiosity and reason. Democracy is not a mansion 
we sometimes get to visit; it’s our house, which we need to build, 
continuously, from the ground up. Today, more than at any time I can 
remember, our soceity’s great hope lies in our facility for contentious 
discussion and our courage to challenge authority. First Amendment law 
must embody the wisdom of Fredrick Douglass: “Power concedes nothing 
without a demand. It never did, and it never will.”107 
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I hope this essay conveys some sense of my profound appreciation for 
the work and ideas of all the symposium contributors. For whatever small 
ways Managed Speech has stimulated their thoughts about our shared 
passion for free speech, their contributions to this symposium have repaid 
me with usurious levels of interest. I am glad for the window my book has 
opened onto the state of First Amendment law, and I am grateful for the 
light my brilliant friends have poured back through that window. 
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